Selected Trends and Phenomena in the Security Environment

Vybrané trendy a javy v bezpečnostnom prostredí

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Abstract:

The aim of this scientific study is to define the security environment, to predict its impact on the functioning of the security system of the Czech Republic, the Visegrad Group countries and the Army of the Czech Republic. The article is based on a sectoral analysis based on the approaches of the Copenhagen School, where Buzan, Waever and de Wilde understand the security environment by sector, using the political, military, economic, social and environmental sectors. Following the available sources, it captures the main development trends in individual sectors with impacts on the security environment. The author's effort is to identify possible implications for defense policy and the armed forces. The author is based primarily on analytical materials prepared in countries sharing the same or similar security environment and security interests of a comparative analysis of available open sources, and the article contains an evaluation of selected state and supranational actors.

Keywords: *security environment, security systém, Visegrad Group, Copenhagen School, development trends, phenomena trends.*

Abstrakt:

Cieľom tejto vedeckej štúdie je definovať bezpečnostné prostredie, predpovedať jeho vplyv na fungovanie bezpečnostného systému Českej republiky, krajín Vyšehradskej štvorky a Armády Českej republiky. Článok je založený na sektorovej analýze založenej na prístupoch Kodanskej školy, kde Buzan, Waever a de Wilde rozumejú bezpečnostnému prostrediu podľa sektorov pomocou politických, vojenských, ekonomických, sociálnych a environmentálnych sektorov. V nadväznosti na dostupné zdroje zachytáva hlavné vývojové trendy v jednotlivých odvetviach s dopadmi na bezpečnostné prostredie. Snahou autora je identifikovať možné dôsledky pre

obrannú politiku a ozbrojené sily. Autor vychádza predovšetkým z analytických materiálov pripravených v krajinách zdieľajúcich rovnaké alebo podobné bezpečnostné prostredie a bezpečnostných záujmov komparatívnej analýzy dostupných otvorených zdrojov a článok obsahuje zhodnotenie vybraných štátnych a nadnárodných aktérov.

.**Kľúčové slová:** *bezpečnostné prostredie, bezpečnostný systém, Vyšehradská skupina, Kodaňská škola, vývojové trendy, trendy javov*

Introduction

In terms of the global security environment, weak states remain a threat. By losing the ability to fulfill the basic functions of the state (especially ensuring security and allocating resources), they lose legitimacy towards the population and thus create a security vacuum that can be filled by other actors. The biggest threat in this sense is violent non-state actors. These developments are contributing to destabilization along the Alliance's borders, which may be reflected in the Euro-Atlantic area, in particular through the spread of radical ideologies, terrorism and increased migration. In principle, two areas can be found where there is a legislative and practical expansion of the powers of the armed forces:

a) in assistance activities for the benefit of the police in the surveillance of state borders,

b) in the field of military inteligence.

Although there is no fundamental change in the role of the armed forces and the redistribution of competencies in ensuring the internal security of the state, the main responsibility for internal security and order in the monitored states remains with non-military security forces, but it shows that the range of tasks that can be, will expand rather than narrow, and excessive one-sided specialization of the armed forces, for example in the emphasis on expeditionary capabilities, may be replaced by completely different requirements. In some Western European countries, the role of the military in ensuring internal security is a long-term issue, most manifested in the surveillance of public space in the event of an increased terrorist threat, often of a long-term nature.

1.   New Trends and Phenomena of Power Organization

Developments in the past two years have disrupted the idea of a conflict-free and trouble-free future at the West's external borders, resp. EU Member States and NATO. The consequences of intense war conflicts on the African continent and in the Middle East region have shown that the existing mechanisms or the applied projection of military force may not be a sufficient or optimal option. The actual disintegration of hitherto relatively stable states such as Libya or Syria caused by the processes that began in the Arab Spring in 2011, or the disintegration of post-conflict Iraq, resp. the control of a large area of its Sunni part by the Islamic State in 2014 not only affected the regions concerned, but also directly affected European states in the form of migratory waves. These events not only reflected in the domestic political development of the affected states, but also resulted in political conflicts at EU level and raised the issue of reviewing existing mechanisms, including in the field of foreign

and security policy, especially in protecting external and internal borders and eliminating terrorist threats. [1].

Russia's intervention in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea have not only provoked tensions between the West and the Russian Federation, but have also created considerable uncertainty in the eastern part of NATO and the EU, ie Member States on a potentially conflict line. At EU level, there has been a response by imposing economic sanctions on the Russian Federation, at NATO level on strengthening the Alliance's military presence in Eastern European member states and emphasizing the need to build and maintain sufficient military capabilities and national commitments to fund their armed forces. At the same time, however, it can be stated that Russian activities in recent years have not de facto violated the power status quo, and have not led to the strengthening of Russia's geopolitical potential; on the contrary, they have weakened the Russian Federation in practice.

For all their relevance, external threat is probably not the main risk factor for the future of the EU and NATO, but their own internal development. The ongoing implementation of Brexit has highlighted the limits of European integration and may lead to speculation as to whether this process will lead to further political disintegration of the EU or, conversely, its internal strengthening. The upcoming US presidential election, in turn, is provoking some transatlantic tensions, given the differing values of some European political elites and the US presidential administration. However, growing concerns about modern American isolationism or a fundamental change in US geopolitical preferences can be a useful impetus for the implementation of a credible security policy both at the level of the EU or NATO's European pillar and at the level of European nation states.

2. New Trends and Challenges for the North Atlantic Alliance and its Allies

Developments in the past two years have disrupted the idea of a conflict-free and trouble-free future at the West's external borders, resp. EU Member States and NATO. The consequences of intense war conflicts on the African continent and in the Middle East region have shown that the existing mechanisms or the applied projection of military force may not be a sufficient or optimal option. The actual disintegration of hitherto relatively stable states such as Libya or Syria caused by the processes that began in the Arab Spring in 2011, or the disintegration of post-conflict Iraq, resp. the control of a large area of its Sunni part by the Islamic State in 2014 not only affected the regions concerned, but also directly affected European states in the form of migratory waves. These events not only reflected in the domestic political development of the affected states, but also resulted in political conflicts at EU level and raised the issue of reviewing existing mechanisms, including in the field of foreign and security policy, especially in protecting external and internal borders and eliminating terrorist threats. [1].

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3. New Trends and Challenges for the North Atlantic Alliance and its Allies

On the threshold of the third decade of the twenty-first century, with the ever-changing security environment, international security relations represent a very complex and also a dynamic sphere of human development. New challenges are evolving as a result of the interaction of vital interests and goals of individual states, international organizations but also non-state actors. It is in the interest of all mankind that conflicts and confrontations be eliminated as much as possible in this interaction, and that relations of tolerance, understanding, cooperation or even integration prevail as much as possible.

There are currently four basic approaches to responding to security challenges and ensuring security.

The first is the territorial emphasis on ensuring the inviolability of state borders and state sovereignty in the face of the threat of external attack.

The second approach is extraterritorial and manifests itself in external interventions or support of selected actors in other countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Mali), etc.

The third approach is intraterritorial and focuses on achieving security by eliminating threats within the country (terrorism, illegal migration , crime, etc.). Finally, the fourth approach is non-territorial, as it defines itself against threats such as sudden climate change (droughts, floods, snow, wind disasters, outbreaks (bird, swine flu) or pandemics (COVID 19, SARS, AIDS).

NATO, the main guarantor of security on the European continent so far, is going through a certain crisis of identity. The Alliance must respond to internal and external stimuli that have not been taken into account much recently in the analysis of the security environment and trends. For the last summits of the alliance, the main topic has become a conflicting relationship to NATO's eastern neighbor. Although regional instability in the post-Soviet space has not escalated since the crisis year of 2014, the conflict in eastern Ukraine has "frozen" and Russian assertiveness or threat has been overshadowed, at least by a number of Member States, by other security threats. However, for Eastern European states, the credibility of the Alliance's approach and deterrence remains a priority. However, NATO's relationship with the Russian Federation is highly dependent on the consensual stance of its members. It turns out that

there are very different views and interests in this regard, and the question is to what extent it will be possible to find the desired consensus on a number of sensitive issues. The source of complications is undoubtedly, for example, the actions of Turkey, whose regional policy does not meet the interests of other members of the alliance, especially Germany and some other European states, and is not in line with the values to which the alliance refers. After all, EU and NATO members are divided in their approach to the Russian Federation, and they also perceive the level of sanctions applied against Russia very differently. The crisis and conflict in Ukraine are gradually losing the mobilization potential it had at the time of its inception. An illustrative example is the "somersaults" of Turkey, which in less than two years has moved from an above-standard partnership to a strongly confrontational position, which is currently being replaced by a re-normalization of mutual relations. At the NATO summit in Warsaw, words resonated about the unprecedented challenges the Alliance is currently facing, from global terrorism to Russian aggression in Ukraine to the immigration crisis, but there are still differing views at Member State level on how to respond to or address these defined challenges. NATO Secretary General J. Stoltenberg described the last Alliance summit as very substantive and largely groundbreaking, as it took place at a crucial moment in formulating a common security policy. The question remains to what extent such declarations will be a declarative matter without any real impact on the formulation of the Alliance's positions and practical steps. In any case, it is clear that the Russian factor has highlighted the neglected need for the armed forces to face confrontation with an advanced conventional adversary. After almost two decades of preference for expeditionary capabilities and high mobility in conflicts with unequal adversaries, attention in this context will probably focus again on territorial defense and conventional operations, as it can not automatically assume the absolute superiority in areas such as electronic warfare, air domination, etc.

4. A Fundamental Principle and Condition for the Functioning of NATO is its Coherence

The North Atlantic Alliance will continue to face the efforts of hostile actors, led by Russia, to undermine the focus of the organization, which sees cohesion as "the ability to react as a group" and to develop common interests and values. NATO sees the absence of a common existential threat to sovereignty and differing threat assessments across the Alliance as a major source of risk to its own cohesion. Efforts by hostile actors to undermine the functioning and unity of NATO and the European Union continue by weakening individual member states (internal sovereignty and the legitimacy of government over citizens) and their support for international institutions. Individual citizens as well as politicians and decision-making bodies become the object of influence. These efforts are evaluated by the Czech Counterintelligence (BIS) as the main goal of the Russian hybrid strategy. Disinformation websites, which are currently one of the most discussed security topics in the Czech Republic, are perceived mainly as part of the smoke screen, which hides more fundamental influential activities of the Russian Federation towards the Czech Republic and its allies. According to the BIS annual report for 2017, the activities of Chinese intelligence services increased further, especially from persons operating under diplomatic cover in the Czech Republic and persons operating from China. One of the main objectives of this activity is to disrupt the EU's coherent policy. The Alliance's cohesion remains threatened by a rise in nationalism, populism, anti-democratic and authoritarian tendencies in a number of EU

and NATO member countries. While the extreme right, which directly denies the constitutional foundations of the state, remains marginalized in Europe and achieves poor results (with the exception of Greece-led), radical-populist actors are currently represented in most parliaments of EU member states. These entities typically take a negative stance on European integration and NATO and some of the values of liberal democracy on which the main pillars of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture are built. In foreign policy, they focus mainly on Russia. Their participation in the government or allowing a minority government can directly affect defense policy in that country. In the case of the Czech Republic, the main risk is a reduction or loss of support for the ACR's involvement in foreign missions, which is the country's main contribution to the Alliance's solidarity and cohesion. The declining legitimacy of governments in many European countries may help increase support for populist actors.

Traditional theories in international relations support the idea that the only legitimate reference object for military security is the state. The state is the sole owner of the right to use the armed forces. If there has been a military threat to the nation-state in history, it has meant, in the traditional concept of security, that its constitutional components and also the government itself are at risk. However, the nation-state is also vulnerable to internal opposition (separatists, unionists, monarchists, revolutionaries, Chechens, Kurds, Quebecs, Basques, Palestinians) whose goal is to seize power and establish a new state.


Fig. 1 The new Copenhagen security agenda. [1]

The new Copenhagen security agenda understands the security system of society more broadly: as a set of components of military VoB security, ecological EkoIB, scientific and technical VaTB, economic EB, social SB, but also moral-spiritual MDB and political security PoB. However, it is logical that a heavily armed neighboring country (a traditional aggressive aggressor) will be portrayed as a threat much more easily than, for example, environmental hazards (Earth climate change, ozone holes, tsunami impacts or other natural disasters). As Barry Buzan puts it: "With the exception of tanks crossing state borders, there are very few truly perceived military threats."

Power is slowly dissolving, concentrating in several world centers. The traditional concept of world security suffers from cracks. The regional, group individual level of security is growing tangibly, as is the importance of the increased number of diverse threats and internal problems faced by individual power centers and states (floods, fires, tsunamis, illegal migration, tornadoes, unemployment, social unrest, etc.). Willingness militarily and by force Engaging beyond one's own boundaries meets reluctance. In the new security environment after the end of the Cold War, the trend of common security is strengthening, because the state level of the causes of possible armed conflict, consisting mainly of targets, aspirations and ideology, is no longer active.

The assumptions are fulfilled that the more liberal the (European) states are in domestic politics, the more peaceful their international behavior is. However, there are still threats to the possible causes of armed conflict. The military threat can be reduced through concrete measures in the framework of international cooperation. The "students" of the Copenhagen School of Security in connection with the end of the Cold War point out that security levels are shifting in the military security sector. From threats to global, continental, national, state to group to individual levels (as perceived by groups and individuals in a given moment, space). Citizens are perceived by the threat of floods more intensely than the "local war" that is currently taking place thousands of kilometers from their flooded property. The regional dynamics of the level of security and threats are gaining in importance. Especially in Western and Central Europe and North America, military threats seem to have disappeared. However, the level of security continues to be affected by historical, geographical and political factors and their interrelationships and, of course, military threats. In the conceptual apparatus of security analysis, Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde emphasize the need to extend the concept of security to new sectors, to which, in addition to the military sector, they include:

• economic sector,

• political sector,

• military sector,

• information sector (new),

• environmental sector,

• social sector.

The military security agenda of the military sector (political-military sector) is the central subject of traditional security studies. At the beginning of the 21st century, as early as the second decade, the vast majority of Western European countries need to deal with military threats. Despite this, however, they maintain large or highly professionally skilled armed forces and often use them in roles that have to do with political and economic intentions rather than military security. In the military sector, as has already been said, the state and the ruling elites of the state have been and remain an important reference object. The central function of the ruling elites (governments) in the national field of security is to maintain civil order, peace, high professional and competent governance, law enforcement and enforcement,

maintaining territorial cohesion and, last but not least, the government's ability to maintain opposition. In the opinion of traditionalists, the government has a sacred right to use force, ie the army or the police against the internal opposition, which is militantly separatist, revolutionary, terrorist, criminal. Traditionalists take the clear view that the military security agenda in practice focuses primarily on the ability of governments to avert internal and external threats to their existence. He argues that the military security agenda in practice must also include the use of force to defend states or governments against non-military threats (such as immigrants, the intrusion of Political Islam). After all, it is evident that threats are aimed at the state from within and without, relations of friendship and hostility are common and can only be effectively responded to by force. Traditionalists think exclusively in the military sector, arguing that the prerogatives of every government clearly include maintaining order, peace, administrative administration, law-making, maintaining territorial cohesion, and the government's ability to maintain itself despite opposition (internal and external). The state with its power tools is the only security wall against the destruction of the state and society. The state has holy rights to coerce and intimidate those who fight against the state. According to traditionalists, the capability (ability) of the state as the owner of the exclusive right to use violence and armed forces is irreplaceable and unmistakable.

5. Contemporary Development of the Security Environment.

An example of the definition of security and the security environment can be threats arising from the use of weapons of mass destruction and if the intervention of the international community or state intervention is already necessary to eliminate this threat, which represents a positive definition of security. [2].he boundaries are very thin in this case, so the question of defining safety limits and a (non) safe environment has come to the forefront of theorists' interest.

In a narrower definition of the term security, individual authors rely primarily on military-political concepts of security and the security environment, where the main actor is the state.

In a broader sense of the security and safety environment, the authors focus on other areas of social life, such as the economic, political, environmental, social, energy and information spheres (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, 2005). At the same time, the security environment and security are perceived not only from one point of view, but from several basic points of view as:

a) individual security - perceived at the level of individuals (individuals), not groups or populations;

b) security of national groups - perceived at the level of organized groups in society, interest groups or political parties;

c) state security - traditionally perceived at the level of states as subjects of international law;

d) security of regional groupings - perceived at the level of various regional groupings, such as the European Union, the African Union, etc .;

e) security of the international environment - perceived at the widest world international level. [2].

Unlike in the past, humanity, more than a possible global military conflict, is now threatened by risks and threats such as unstable political regimes, failing states and unsecured borders that allow not only illegal migration but also trafficking in human organs, arms, drugs and various goods, ethnic and religious conflicts, lack of resources and high crime. Addressing serious problems of devastation and degradation of the living and security environment, depletion of resources, industrial and natural disasters, epidemics, pandemics (COVID19, AIDS, MERS, etc.). Behavior and actions in several spheres of society threaten the very existence and development of man as a biological species.

The current, turbulently developing world brings many positive but also negative facts, which are manifested in various areas of human life and society. This is evidenced by the existing and ubiquitous threats and risks that rightly put security issues first. It is a basic and necessary condition for the development of any society. It can be stated that there is no area of social life that is not connected with it. At present, therefore, security is one of the most common and most inflected concepts in all its forms. [4]. The security environment of the world and Europe is gradually changing.

The security environment is determined by the existence, development of mutual relations and interactions of security subjects. The security environment represents the spatial dimension of security associated with the action of individual actors at a certain time, under certain conditions and circumstances. Current significant security factors include global inequalities (poverty, hunger), climate change (land degradation, water scarcity), consumption growth, world population growth (especially in the Third World), armed conflict and migration [7]. Undoubtedly, the main players in the field of the global security environment in the next decade of the 21st century are: the United States, the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, the member states of the European Union, resp. EU, BRICS countries. [3]. However, it is a fact that a process of growth and strengthening of the economic, political, as well as security influence of a number of new ones is currently underway the so-called emerging powers. It includes India, Brazil, Indonesia, Turkey, and also Mexico. The basic characteristic of the American perception of security is to ensure the vital interests of the security of citizens and the state against external and internal threats, and these threats can be real, presumed or potential. Russia emphasizes "balance of power", "zones of interest". The PRC is the fastest growing global player that the United States, NATO, the European Union and the Russian Federation have to reckon with. The main security theme of recent years, which has had a greater real impact on EU Member States, was the migration crisis. Functioning of European structures and has significantly contributed to the polarization of views both within the EU and in the societies of individual nation states. The time seems to be ripe for a fundamental redefinition of the current concept of European defense policy and its instruments.

The main security theme of recent years, which has had a greater real impact on EU Member States, has been the migration crisis, which has revealed a number of weaknesses in the functioning of European structures and significantly contributed to polarization of views both within the EU and in national societies. The time seems to be ripe for a fundamental redefinition of the current concept of European defense policy and its instruments. Regional conflicts following the so-called Arab Spring also point to the limited contribution of European so-called soft power. In connection with the migration crisis, on the other hand, we were able to observe the erosion of the

common European security policy and the return to an autonomous, often uncoordinated and externally criticized approach of individual nation states.

In terms of the military-strategic potential of the three Eurasian powers - Russia, China and India - the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), founded in 2001, has significant potential and its members include Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in addition to Russia and China. India, along with Iran, Pakistan and Mongolia, has observer status. In a global context, it is significant that the SCO, as it stands, covers almost half of the world's population and a very significant part of Eurasia, three major economies, vast reserves of energy resources and four nuclear-weapon states. The SCO is mainly a geopolitical axis in Russia-China relations, enabling them to deepen their political, economic and military influence over significant parts of Eurasia, although there are some different approaches between the two countries in relation to the SCP's objectives. [6] The growth of economic power and thus of the political influence of the emerging powers thus redraws the power map of the Earth.

6. Is the EC Proposal a New Start for EU Migration Policy?

Asylum policy is one of the EU's priority but also controversial areas of action. The aim of asylum policy is in particular to harmonize asylum procedures in the Member States. The same rights and a common asylum system should apply to all third-country nationals. Uniform minimum criteria for granting asylum and a uniform asylum procedure are intended to provide increased protection, while ensuring that national asylum systems are not abused. Asylum policy is regulated in the Treaty of Lisbon by Articles 67 and 78 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 18 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. [9]. The European Commission presented a proposal for a new asylum and migration system on September 23, 2020, in which, according to it, all states of the European Union should participace in solidarity. [10]. The package, which the Commission intends to replace the current and not very functional rules of in the migration crisis of recent years, is intended to speed up and streamline the return of migrants to their place of origin. It is anticipated that solidarity with other states of the Union may take various forms. Member States of the bloc will normally be able to either take over refugees or, at their own expense, arrange for the return of unsuccessful asylum seekers, or otherwise assist. Exceptionally, in crisis situations, Brussels is to order Member States to accept some refugees or to return some migrants to their country of origin. The EU Commission expects the system to allow a much higher percentage of migrants to return without asylum within a few months than is currently the case, with around a third being sent back from the EU. The proposal therefore provides for the introduction of five-day preliminary checks and a maximum of 12 weeks at the border procedure, during which a decision should be taken on the future of the applicants. Unlike the failed system of mandatory quotas, which, together with the Czech Republic, was also rejected by Poland and Hungary, the EC now offers countries a choice. If they receive refugees from congested countries or people rescued at sea, they will receive a contribution of 10 thousand euros (270 thousand crowns) per person. The question arises: Does the EC want to buy the support of the "rebel states of the V4"? Despite a number of positives, it is indisputable that the new asylum and migration system contains a hidden directive redistribution of migrants and offers false

solidarity. The V4 countries and Austria, with the support of this version of the new asylum and migration system offered by the EC, will have significant problems.[4].

Fig. 2 Brexit.[2]

If they do not want to receive such refugees, they can arrange for the return of those who are not entitled to asylum at their own expense. Only in the case of exceptional congestion in a country that other countries cannot resolve on a voluntary basis would "compulsory solidarity" come into play. Under it, the EC could attribute to a member country a part of the number of refugees determined on the basis of economic performance and population size. The state would then have to accept them or arrange for their return home. This point is likely to arouse opposition in some EU states, which have long rejected any mandatory redistribution. For example, the Czech Minister of the Interior, Jan Hamáček, ruled out the compulsory admission of migrants. It is certainly to be welcomed that the Commission also envisages in the proposal that it be more strictly monitored whether the states at the external border are complying with all their obligations.

7. Cyber Threats - one of the Most Significant Security Threats in the Second Decade of the 21st Century.

The communications and information technology sector is currently one of the fastest growing areas of society. The development of the Internet and modern computer technologies is significantly reflected not only in the private sphere, but is also increasingly interfering in the state and public administration and at the same time in the field of security. It can be stated that communication and information technologies and devices, with their wide range of uses, have reached almost all areas of social life. [3]. In addition to many positives, there are also many negatives in international terrorism, threats of the use of weapons of mass destruction, cross-border organized crime, mass illegal migration and, more recently, cyber attacks on public or private computer networks. Cyber threats are thus becoming one of the most significant security threats in the second decade of the 21st century. [7].We are increasingly witnessing events during which cyberspace is becoming the scene of

negative operations aimed at states as well. However, this is far from the first and unfortunately probably not the last such activities. Concerns about cyberspace and cybersecurity are as old as the Internet itself. Examples include 1998 and the attacks of 3,000 Chinese hackers on Indonesian government sites. [3]. Tens of thousands of attempts to infiltrate computer networks under the Ministries of Defense, banks, the media, etc. are also known. and their numbers are constantly growing.[1] All these cases confirm that cyber security is an integral part of national security. [3].

8. Coronavirus SARS-CoV-2: a Great Ganger for Today's Society

Coronavirus refers to four genera of viruses that cause disease in animals and humans of varying degrees of severity. The name comes from the characteristic arrangement of the surface of the lipid envelope of viruses in the shape of a solar corona. Of the coronavirus family, SARS, for example, is already known to the world and began to spread epidemically around 2003.A pandemic of the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus virus covid-19 broke out in late 2019 in Wuhan, Hubei Province, central China, and was initially referred to by the Chinese press as Wuchan pneumonia. It was not until 30 January 2020 that the World Health Organization declared the epidemic a global state of emergency (PHEIC), the sixth in a row since 2009, when it was first declared a Mexican swine flu pandemic. with worldwide expansion. On 13 March, WHO chief Ghebreyesus called Europe the main epicenter of the disease. As of June 15, 2020, with a few specific exceptions, the virus spread to all countries of the world on all continents except Antarctica. An experiment that created a hybrid version of a bat coronavirus — one related to the virus that causes SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) — has triggered renewed debate over whether engineering lab variants of viruses with possible pandemic potential is worth the risks. Engineered bat virus stirs debate over risky research Lab-made coronavirus related to SARS can infect human cells. In an article published in Nature Medicine1 on 9 November [11], scientists investigated a virus called SHC014, which is found bats in China. The researchers created a chimaeric virus, made up of a surface protein of SHC014 [2] and the backbone of a SARS virus that had been adapted to grow in mice and to mimic human disease. The chimaera infected human airway cells — proving that the surface protein of SHC014 has the necessary structure to bind to a key receptor on the cells and to infect them. It also caused disease in mice, but did not kill them. Simon Wain-Hobson [3], a virologist at the Pasteur Institute in Paris, points out that the researchers have created a novel virus that "grows remarkably well" in human cells. "If the virus escaped,

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[1] Of the last cyber operations of this type, we can mention those from October 2018, focused on the networks of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic.

[2] SHC014-CoV is a SARS-like coronavirus (SL-COV) which infects horseshoe bats (fam. Rhinolophidae), first discovered in China in 2013.

[3] Simon Wingain-Hobson, a virologist at the Pasteur Institute in Paris, warns that (GOF) means the deliberate transformation of viruses (bird flu) that are not transmissible between humans into viruses capable of efficient transmission from mammals to mammals. Therefore, the same can be assumed for SARS.

nobody could predict the trajectory," he says. In October 2014, the US government imposed a moratorium on federal fading of such fresearch on the viruses that cause SARS, influenza and MERS (Middle East respiratory

Fig. 3 Coronavirus scheme. [3]

syndrome, a deadly disease caused by a virus that sporadically jumps from camels to people). The latest study was already under way before the US moratorium began, and the US National Institutes of Health (NIH) allowed it to proceed while it was under review by the agency, says Ralph Baric, an infectious-disease researcher at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, a co-author of the study. The NIH eventually concluded that the work was not so risky as to fall under the moratorium, he says.[4]

In Europe, a new coronavirus appeared on Friday, January 24, 2020, when the first cases of the disease were reported by France. On the night of Tuesday, January 28, Germany reported the first infected, followed by Finland, Italy, Russia, Great Britain, Sweden, Spain, Belgium and the Czech Republic.

The first three cases appeared in the Czech Republic on March 1, 2020, these people lived in high-risk areas in northern Italy. A "linear" pandemic development followed. Tough government actio and the covid problem seemed to be solved. Unfortunately, the number of tests performed daily in the Czech Republic has increased. But the percentage of positives is also rising. Figures mapping the trends and characteristics of coronavirus infection in the Czech Republic confirm that long-term and close contact between those closest to them is a breeding ground for the epidemic. The data provided by the Institute of Health Information and Statistics (IHIS CR) show that half of those infected became infected in the family. The second most common place of transmission is work. Only units of percent then fall on medical and social care facilities. Not even a percentage of all transmissions took place within the hospitals of long-term patients. Other forms make up 14 percent. In a family environment, there is a long-term and close contact between people in enclosed

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[4]   The author of the scientific study is aware that this story, is used as a basis for unproven theories that a new coronavirus causing COVID-19 has been developed. There is no evidence that this is true; The researchers believe that the animal is the most likely source of coronavirus.

spaces. The three basic lessons - disinfection, veil and safe distance - are usually not followed in one household. A systematic meta-analysis the current knowledge of Czech epidemiologists found that adherence to at least one meter, use of drapes and eye protection reduced the risk of transmission of the original SARS, MERS and new coronavirus SARS-CoV-2. An even lower risk was the two-meter distance and wearing respirators. The fact is that covid pandemics change society's behavior. This pandemic threat turns out to be extremely dangerous and society will have to come to terms with it. [11].

Conclusion

The results provide realistic answers to the questions asked at the beginning of this study:

1) EU Member States move in the rhythm of political forces (NS) between the Council of Europe (RE), the European Parliament (EP), the European Commission (ES) and NATO, with supranational structures dominating 85%.

2) The hybrid behavior of political (non) elites has a clear negative impact on the security of Europeans.

3) The third decade of the 21st century is a mirror that reflects the image of prosperity and security from a different angle than in previous years. The main security risks for the security environment include:

- Insufficient funding for Member States' defenses, the permeability of the Schengen area, the closure of public space, despite the fact that democracy is a system of equality and openness to public space, affects the security environment.

4)) The trend of insufficient financing of Member States' defense can only be reversed by increasing defense spending, adjusting national budgets, reducing duplication of armaments, modernizing the armies of EU Member States.

The main objective of the study was therefore to examine and assess the extent to which the functioning of the security systems of the EU and the Member States is threatened:

1) Underestimating the fact that democracy is a system of equality and openness to public space and the security environment. The main players for the global and local security environment are: the United States, the Russian Federal Republic and the People's Republic of China.

2) The vast majority of EU Member States finance defense below 2% of GDP.

3) It is a fact that the security system of the countries of the European Union and national (member) states is located in a rhombus of often opposing forces: the European Union, NATO, the Council of Europe and the European Commission. In addition, "Brexit" is a loss that translates into reduced economic growth and GDP in all EU Member States.

Possible classification of scientific significance:

1) Strategic significance: Strategic plans and long-term visions for the further development of the European integration process will not be possible without adjustments in the years 2021 - 2027.

2) Information significance: presentation of security risks and threats to the European Union and nation states in the development decade of the 21st century.

3) The importance of cognitivity: an analytical description of the expected safety risks, the possibilities of their prevention and overcoming.

4) Scientific significance: it consists in predicting ways to prevent potential risks, the internal and external relations of a "two-speed Europe" (old and new Member States of the Union) for the European (global) security area. Current significant security factors include global inequalities (poverty, hunger), climate change (land degradation, water scarcity), consumption growth, world population growth (especially in the Third World), armed conflict and migration.

Acknowledgement

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